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THE CHARTER, EQUALITY RIGHTS,
AND WOMEN: EQUIVOCATION AND
CELEBRATION©
BY DIANA MAJURY'
In this article, the author examines some of the
critiques made and some of the aspirations raised in the
early days of the Charter by left/feminist/marginalized
groups about the Charter, the equality guarantee, and
the judicial decision makers. The author explores how
these fears and hopes have played out with respect to
Charter equality rights for women by looking at some of
the sex equality decisions that have been made by the
Supreme Court of Canada. The cases are discussed
under the headings of reproduction, violence against
women, family, employment, and socio-economicclaims
to explore how the sex equality analysis has fared in
these different contexts. As the title of this article
reflects, the author's assessment is one of equivocal
celebration and celebratory equivocation.
Dans cet article, 'auteur examine A la fois les
critiques et les ambitions exprim~es par les f6ministes,
les groupes marginalis6s et les gauchistes dans les jours
suivant 1'entr~e en vigeur de la Charte canadienne des
droits et des libertlds, ainsi que les critiques faites 5 1'6gard
de la garantie d'6galit6 et des d6cideurs judiciaires.
L'auteur examine comment ces craintes et ces ambitions
se sont materialis~es vis- .-vis les droits d'6galit6 des
femmes en examinant lesd~cisions pertinentes dmanant
de la Cour suprdme du Canada. Pour comprendre
comment I'analyse de 1'6galit6 sexuelle a 6t6 reconnue
parmi des contextes vari6s, I'auteur 6tudie ces d6cisions
sous les rubriques de la reproduction, la violence contre
les femmes, la famille, le travail et les revendications
socio-conomiques. La conclusion de l'auteur en est une
d'incertitude qui doit 6tre cl6br~e, et d'une incertitude
festive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Charter,' and particularly the equality rights provision2, has
generated a proliferation of legal and social science scholarship; it has been
the subject of innumerable conferences, symposia, and workshops. Much
of this Charter writing and talking has been of the abstract, think-piece type
of scholarship 3 -to which this article aspires to contribute. This attention
alone tells us a great deal about the significance of the Charter and its
impact-it has us talking, thinking, writing, and debating about the role of
law, its possibilities and its limitations, its seductions and its portents. And,
while the questions and the arguments relating to law more generally, as
well as to specific attempts to use law to further social change, may basically
be the same as they were in pre-Charter days, the Charter has reinvigorated
these debates such that they are very much alive and lively, informing and
directing the more specific, focused Charter analysis. As someone who
would describe herself as a Charter pragmatist4 , I savour the questions and
challenges that force me to think more deeply, more skeptically, more big-
picturely, and, I hope, more radically, about Charter work-its
effectiveness, its limitations, its unintended consequences, and its larger
political and social meanings. I think that we all need to be held
accountable, and to account, for our thinking and for our activism; these
intense Charter discussions and disagreements are an important part of that
process of accountability.
In this article, I want to look at some of the major criticisms and
concerns that left/feminist/marginalized groups have raised about the
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II [Charter].
2 Ibid., s. 15. The equivocation reflected in the title, that inheres in section 15 of the Charter and
in feminist responses to it, arises even in relation to the creation of this special issue of the Osgoode
Hall Law Journal celebrating-or at least recognizing-the twentieth anniversary of the Charter. 2002
is not the twentieth anniversary of section 15 of the Charter; it did not come into effect until three years
later, in 1985. In terms of celebration or recognition, this can be read two ways. One way is to see this
as a continuing slight to section 15, the tag-along younger sister, who is included in the party but whose
unique history, status, and struggles are repudiated by that inclusion. Alternatively, or I prefer,
simultaneously, one can see this as doubling the opportunities to mark the advent of section 15. She
cannot be left out of the general Charter attention, but she will have her own exclusive party in three
years' time. She is the difficult younger sister who demands more than her share of the attention
because ... she deserves it.
3 This is somewhat ironic, given that abstractness is a critique that many writing in this vein make
of the Charter itself.
See infra, Part II.A., for a discussion of what I mean by this term.
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Charter, about rights, and about equality5 and some of the more positive
Charter/rights/equality expectations from among these same groups,
looking for points of difference and commonality among these writers.6
This background will help me look specifically at if and how these concerns
and expectations have played out with respect to the Charter, equality
rights, and women, which is the subject of this article, by looking at some
of the sex equality cases that have come before the Supreme Court of
Canada.
II. ACADEMIC WRITINGS
A. On the Charter Generally
The strongest and most vociferous critiques of rights discourse
generally, and the Charter more specifically, have largely emanated from
the white, male left, generally reflecting a marxist or class-based
perspective.7 One of the primary issues that underlies the Charter critique
for many on the left is the power the Charter cedes to the courts, that is, to
elite, unelected judges who are largely unaccountable. According to Harry
Glasbeek, "[n]o matter how little we think of our existing democratic
institutions, they are intended to be democratic," while courts and judges
5
I am engaging here only with the critiques and discussions from among what might be termed
"progressives." I am not looking at right-wing critiques, even though there are some interesting
parallels and resonances among right and left critics. See Sheila McIntyre, "Feminist Movement in
Law: Beyond Privileged and Privileging Theory" in Radha Jhappan, ed., Women's Legal Strategies in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 42.
6Despite my tendency to portray them as oppositional, I see these positions more as interrelated
and overlapping, situated along a continuum.
71 think it is important to try to identify who articulates various positions, that is who it is that
is talking positively or negatively about the Charter, as a means of contextualizing and de-
individualizing these discussions and providing additional political grounding for an analysis of what
is being said. As one who believes that race, gender, etc., for example, matter to who we are, how we
are treated, and relatedly then to how we think about the world, I think it is important to try to factor
(as best one can) our multiple identities into the analysis of academics' work. The critique of the
approach that I am advocating mirrors the more general critique of a grounds-based approach to
discrimination. According to this critique, identity categories are artificial compartments that
oversimplify and give rise to unwarranted assumptions and to the unreflective attribution of group
characteristics. Given that the categories are the problem, relying on them inevitably reinforces the
problem, that is one is actively engaging in the act one is critiquing when one categorizes people on
these bases (race, gender, etc.). It is true that categorization .is the source of discrimination; it is
discrimination that makes the categories matter. But that is the very point, the catch
22-discrimination does make the categories significant-the recognition that our experiences (of
discrimination as well as of identity-based pride and connection) and our situation have an impact on
our thinking. Group membership is not determinative, but it is a factor in forming one's perspective.
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"...[are] not, in any serious way, subject to the discipline of democratic
politics ... ."' Glasbeek credits democracy-electoral mechanisms and
public sphere activities-with the imposition of human rights obligations
as a mechanism to force government and private sector actors "... to deal
more equitably in respect of differences," and then asks why we would
"entrust our future to an appointed, electorally unaccountable institution
such as the judiciary which has never produced any analogous results?"9
But his question ignores the fact that much of the public sphere activity
referred to actually took place in the courts. Frequently what has happened
in the courts has forced our elected representatives to take action on the
human rights front.'° Legislative action acknowledging and supporting basic
human rights has been painfully slow, often vigorously resisted, and
sometimes enacted despite public opinion to the contrary. Minority rights
and marginalized groups present a serious challenge to those who put their
faith and hope in democracy, however flawed. Canada has a long history of
sexist and racist legislation;" the courts have provided one forum in which
to challenge and resist such majority dominance. There is something to be
said for an independent judiciary with the power to make unpopular
decisions, particularly in the context of human rights.
The Charter has become somewhat of a lightning rod in the larger
debates about parliamentary supremacy and judicial activism and about
legal, as opposed to political, engagement. Those commentators who are
negative about the Charter tend to view the legal and the political as
separate arenas, implying that intervention is an either/or proposition.
Those who are more sanguine about the Charter generally see the two
arenas as highly interrelated and are often adept at playing one off against
the other. The interplay between the courts and the legislatures opens up
additional spaces for public participation and arguably strengthens the
democratic process.
8 Harry J. Glasbeek, "From Constitutional Rights to 'Real' Rights - "R-i-i-g-hts Fo-or-wa-ard
Ho"!?" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 468 at 469-70.
9 Ibid. at 470.
10 The history of Canadian sexual harassment law is one example and the inclusion of sexual
orientation in Alberta's human rights legislation is another.
See Constance Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth-Century
Canada (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1991) and Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal
History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1999).
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The concern of largely unfettered1 2 judicial authority under the
Charter relates to several critiques levelled against the Charter. The
abstractness and indeterminacy of rights heighten concerns about judicial
elitism and the lack of judicial constraints. Relatedly, the symmetrical and
universal nature of the rights provided by the Charter are considered
problematic. Charter rights and protections are available to everyone and,
because they are themselves without substantive content, they can be
employed for almost any purpose. This problem is compounded by the
perception of these rights as individualistic, exclusionary, and not amenable
to group-based analysis or collective action. Given our judiciary and the
absence of more specific direction from the Charter, it is more likely that
rights will be interpreted to reproduce existing power relations and protect
the status quo than to challenge and redress inequities.
Joel Bakan argues that the Charter is infused with the ideology of
formal equality such that individuals are abstracted out of concrete social
relations of inequality and portrayed as formal equals. 13 The ideology of
formal equality masks and neutralizes inequality. In this context, disparate
impact is constructed as natural and inevitable or as a product of choice or
consent, and not as a function of discrimination. Marginalized claimants
then have an uphill battle to prove inequality or discrimination, especially
when that inequality is long-standing and deeply entrenched. Andrew
Petter and Alan Hutchinson argue that rights provide a "veneer of
consensus," the illusion of shared values and aspirations, that makes it
more difficult to detect and respond to underlying disagreements and
power struggles."
By abstracting and individualizing, rights and rights discourse are
seen to depoliticize issues of power and domination, making them more
palatable and manageable, even rendering them invisible. The process of
translating oppression and domination into the legal language of rights,
discrimination, and equality is seen by Charter critics as necessarily
conservative.' 5 The arguments and analysis put before the courts are
12 The question of the extent to which the judiciary is fettered is also subject to debate. Section
33 of the Charter, the "notwithstanding clause," leaves the final word to Parliament, if it has the
courage to invoke it.
13 Joel Bakan,"Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What
You Want (Nor What You Need)" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 307.
14 Andrew Petter & Allan C. Hutchinson, "Rights in Conflict: The Dilemma of Charter
Legitimacy" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 531.
15 WilliamE. Conklin, "'Access to Justice' As Access to a Lawyer's Language" (1990) 10 Windsor
Y.B. Access Just. 454.
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constrained and distorted so that even a victory can at best be only partial
and inadequate, easily subverted and turned against the more vulnerable.
The Charter creates the illusion of social change and the mirage of a better
world that captures the imagination and energy of progressive people who
are then diverted into expensive and protracted legal battles that are
conservatizing and counterproductive.
Charter critics view the anti-rights, anti-Charter backlash as
reflecting negatively on the Charter and creating a more hostile and
reactionary environment. The backlash is often framed in terms of formal
equality that is being used to try to roll back earlier gains made by
subordinated groups. Charter advocates, on the other hand, interpret the
backlash as indicative of at least some successes under the Charter and
point to the overtly political nature of the backlash as proof against the
claim of Charter depoliticization. The formal versus substantive equality
debate generated by the Charter is seen as significant, warranting serious
public attention and involvement. The Charter has done much to foster
public discussions about the meaning of equality in very concrete terms.
Given its exclusive application to government action, the Charter is
criticized as inevitably reinforcing the segregation constructed between
public and private, thereby enabling powerful private sector exploiters to
evade social responsibility while portraying themselves as victims.
Autonomous, "equal," private actors are seen as needing protection from
the heavy-handed, interventionist state. The Charter reinforces the power
imbalances, privilege, exploitation, and domination that permeate the
private sphere. Private actors, including individuals, corporations, and
institutions, are immune from having to adhere to Charter values in their
own interactions but are encouraged to invoke the Charter when they
believe the state is trenching on their private turf, reconfigured into rights
through Charter discourse.
Even though they are general in nature, these criticisms of the
Charter seem to focus primarily on the likely results in cases and on the
negative uses that can and have been made of the Charter. Feminists, on the
other hand, have tended to see the Charter as part of a bigger picture and
a longer-term strategy.'6 While most feminists would, to a large extent,
make these same criticisms, they tend to see them as cautions or concerns
rather than as reasons to reject the Charter. The Charter is seen as
16 This is not to say that all feminists support the Charter; feminists articulate the full range of
perspectives on the Charter. My comments here are generalizations and suffer the over-inclusion
problem of all generalizations. Nonetheless, I think that feminists tend to be drawn to the more
pragmatic, it's-worth-a-try end of the Charter spectrum.
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providing a forum for raising issues; for developing more sophisticated
analysis and argument for public, judicial, and political education; and for
mobilizing and politicization.17 From this perspective, the outcomes of
individual cases are of less importance, and negative Charter arguments and
decisions provide fodder for future action. Rather than masking
disagreement and power differentials, the Charter is seen as offering an
opportunity to bring these matters explicitly to the foreground.
Rather than falling into either the Charter optimist/enthusiast or the
Charter pessimist/resister/skeptic categories that are often invoked, I would
describe most feminists (including myself) who work in this area as Charter
pragmatists who see the Charter as one among a limited number of
potential tools to expose and to argue for the redress of women's and other
marginalized groups' subordination. We have no illusions that Charter
litigation is an easy undertaking; we know that it is fraught with dangers,
both foreseen and unforeseen, and that whatever we do will have negative
as well as positive repercussions. We know that when we invoke the Charter
we take a calculated risk, and we try to make these calculations carefully
and thoroughly. But we also know that to ignore the Charter is to ignore an
opportunity, as well as to concede the equality terrain to those who would
use it to justify and perpetuate inequality. This Charter pragmatism is
consistent with the prevailing feminist attitude to law more generally-a
strong critique of law, coupled with a recognition of the significance of law
as a site of power and hence an arena for struggle, and of the practical
impossibility of eschewing law altogether.
18
From her perspective as an Aboriginal woman, Mary Ellen Turpel
provides a much more fundamental critique of the rights paradigm and of
the Charter than any criticism outlined above.19 She calls into question the
cultural authority of the Charter, pointing out that the Charter imposes a
culturally and historically specific conceptual framework on people who do
not share that culture or that history. Aboriginal people are put in the
impossible position of having to assert cultural difference through the
medium of an alien framework that is incapable of understanding or
reflecting that difference. The fact that Aboriginal people have, in
17 See McIntyre, supra note 5 and Didi Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay
Legal Equality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
18 See e.g. Sherene Razack, "Using Law for Social Change: Historical Perspectives" (1992) 17
Queen's L.J. 31; Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989).
19 Mary Ellen Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies,
Cultural Differences" in Richard F. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1991) 503.
20021
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particular situations, chosen to rely on Charter rights is not an uncritical
endorsement of the Charter but may simply be a concession to its
dominance and a reflection of the urgency of, or lack of options with
respect to, the specific issue.2" Turpel does not attempt to resolve what is
an unresolvable dilemma posed by "... problems of conceptual reference
for which there is no common grounding or authoritative foothold."'"
Equality rights present a similar dilemma for members of other
subordinated groups who seek to invoke them. To varying degrees, they too
will not share in the language or in the conceptual framework of the
Charter. The challenge that Turpel describes for a judge adjudicating in a
situation involving cultural difference may apply to other situations of
"difference:"
For a judge, a situation of cultural difference should be and must be a situation of not
knowing which direction to go, a situation involving choices about reasoning that may not
be defensible or acceptable. It involves episodes of undecidability, self-judgment, and
uncertainty. It would involve acknowledging the imperative of admitting mistakes and
recognizing ignorance.
22
This imperative can be taken up by advocates who present equality
claims that challenge underlying premises and taken-for-grantedisms. To
try to use the Charter to its fullest, they need to take the risk of attempting
to shift accepted truths and understandings and ways of knowing and to
muster the confidence and courage to put forward arguments that may
appear indefensible or unacceptable. 3
B. On Equality
"Equality is thus a process-a process of constant and flexible
examination, of vigilant introspection, and of aggressive open-
20
The complexities of this dilemma are readily apparent in the case of the Native Women's
Association of Canada v. Canada, [199413 S.C.R. 627 [NWAC] in which NWAC sought and was denied
funding and rights to participate in the constitutional review process equal to the four national
Aboriginal organizations included by the federal government. The intersectional discrimination of race
and sex placed some Aboriginal women in an intolerable, bifurcated position that the Court did not
address or even acknowledge in its decision in this case.
21 Supra note 19 at 508.
22 Ibid. at 527.
23
I see this as a particularly suitable role for intervenors whose job it is to bring a different
perspective before the court and who are not constrained by the needs and interests of clients.
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mindedness." 24
Much of the academic writing examining the equality guarantee in
the early days of the Charter referred to debates over the meaning of
equality as largely a debate between formal and substantive equality. At
that time, formal equality was the dominant understanding of what equality
meant and required. Formal equality is premised on the understanding that
equality means treating likes alike and posits same treatment as its
defining feature. It focuses on procedures with the goal of ensuring equality
of opportunity. Substantive equality recognizes that in order to further
equality, policies and practices need to respond to historically and socially
based differences. Substantive equality looks to the effects of a practice or
policy to determine its equality impact, recognizing that in order to be
treated equally, dominant and subordinated groups may need to be treated
differently.
While feminists were unanimous in their rejection of the formal
equality approach and their support for the substantive model of equality,
they were dubious about the likelihood of Canadian courts adopting
substantive equality as the guarantee provided by section 15. However,
more recent equality writing accepts that substantive equality is the
operative model in Canadian law.25 This breakthrough came in the
Andrews 26 case, the first decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on
section 15. For all those who are not Charter resisters or Charter rejecters,
the endorsement of substantive equality must be seen as a positivestep.
The feminist response to Andrews ranged from enthusiasm to cautious
optimism. Among the cautiously optimistic were those who were skeptical
about courts' ability to make the transition from formal to substantive
equality in more than name. Whatever we called it, the fear was that courts
would inevitably and unconsciously continue to focus on likeness (to
dominant groups) as the key to equality in terms of recognition and of
remedy. This fear has magnified, not dissipated, in the years sinceAndrews.
I increasingly hear the claim being made among social activists involved in
Charter litigation that we (lawyers, activists, and judges) have not really
moved beyond a formal equality analysis. This critique raises some very
24 Rosalie Abella, "Limitations on the Right to Equality Before the Law" in Armand de Mestral
et aL., eds., The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon
Blais, 1986) 223 at 225.
25 See e.g. The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, "Equality: The Most Difficult Right"
(2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 17. According to Chief Justice McLachlin, at 21, "[slubstantive equality
is recognized worldwide as the governing legal paradigm."
26 Law Society of British Couimbia v. Andrews, [19891 1 S.C.R. 143 [Andrews].
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fundamental questions (for example, whether because it is a comparative
concept, equality can ultimately only mean formal equality, albeit in forms
more sophisticated than treating x and y identically) about what is meant
by formal and substantive equality. The cases confirm that these continue
to be difficult questions on which we have not progressed very far, if at all,
beyond the judicial thinking inAndrews. Some of the most recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada raise the spectre that the Court is slipping
backward in its understanding of and commitment to substantive equality.
Feminist legal scholars were engaging with these equality critiques
long before the advent of the Charter and these debates continue. For some
feminists, the problems inherent in equality as an analytical tool and as a
goal render it of extremely limited utility for women and other
subordinated groups. In taking this position, Radha Jhappan provides a
strong and articulate critique of the concept of equality. She argues that "...
the discourse of legal equality as an overarching goal and strategy is an idea
whose time may have passed."27 One of her primary criticisms is the
inherently comparative nature of equality, a criticism that anticipates the
question raised above of whether an equality analysis can ever lead to
anything more than variations on the formal equality theme. While I am
sympathetic to this critique and share the concern, I am not convinced that
other concepts, including the concept of justice that Jhappan prefers, are
not also limited by an implicit need for comparators.28
The need for comparison gives rise to the related critique of
essentialism-that equality posits women and men each as undifferentiated,
unidimensional groups. Differences among women, as among men, are
ignored; other sites of oppression are treated as irrelevant. Further, the
esssentialism leads to assimilationist arguments, with white men as the
standard to which all women are assumed to aspire and against which they
are inevitably compared. Such an approach is incapable of understanding,
not to mention addressing, the intersectional discrimination and disparate
aspirations of those who are more than one identity removed from the
dominant group. Here again the critique is of the formal model of equality
and raises the question whether it is practically possible to use equality to
move beyond that model to address the diverse needs and experiences of
27Radha Jhappan, "The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice" (1998) 10 C.J.W.L. 60 at
63.
28 Jhappan argues that a justice approach would lead to the determination of a more appropriate
reference group (ibid. at 95). Thus, even with justice one faces the problem of finding the appropriate
reference or comparator group. While this is an ongoing problem that can seriously hamper or deflect
the analysis of judges and litigators, I am not sure that there is anything inherent in either the justice
concept or the equality concept that more, or less, effectively directs the comparative analysis.
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women. Jhappan thinks not: "... the equality frame is simply too narrow to
contain the complex intersectional analysis because it is by nature
comparative (one group compared against another), esssentialist and ...
impossible., 29 These are pressing concerns, but it may be that whatever
concept is adopted will be limited by prevailing assumptions and values and
that the issue is less about finding the better concept and more about trying
to make the concept at hand do what one wants it to.
In the Charter-lobbying days, feminists were not confident that an
anti-discrimination equality provision would provide adequate protection
to women. The perceived need for additional protection for women was
grounded in the dismal history of sex discrimination complaints under the
Canadian Bill of Rights,30 U.S. jurisprudence under the U.S. Constitution"
whereby sex discrimination allegations were subjected only to intermediate
scrutiny rather than the more strict scrutiny accorded to some other forms
of discrimination, as well as in fears generated by the inclusion of a
perceived deference to multicultural rights in section 27 of the Charter.
32
For these reasons, section 28, the separate sex equality provision of the
Charter that states, "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights
and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female
persons," was considered of vital importance by those who were advocating
on behalf of women's rights when the Charter was being drafted and going
through the parliamentary process. While some critics saw section 28 as
meaningless, arguing that it added nothing to the Charter,33 much of the
early feminist writing on the Charter saw great possibilities for the effective
use of section 28. Colleen Sheppard saw this in relation to the enhancement
of section 7 rights for women: "The radical potential of this section [28]
becomes apparent if we contemplate the notion of equal liberty or security
of the person for women and men. '34 Mary Eberts argued that section 28
29 Supra note 27 at 79.
30 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
U.S. Const. [U.S. Constitution].
32 Mary Eberts, "Sex-based Discrimination and the Charter" in Anne F. Bayefsky & Mary Eberts,
eds., Equality and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 183;
Katherine J. de Jong, "Seiual Equality: Interpreting Section 28" in Bayefsky & Eberts, ibid. at 493; and
Penny Kome, The Taking of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution (Toronto: Women's Press,
1983).
See e.g. Elmer A. Driedger, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982) 14
Ottawa L. Rev. 366 at 373.
34N. Colleen Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" (1986) 10 Dal. L.J. 195 at 222.
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"should ... lead a court to require a high level of justification [under section
1] for any sex-based distinction. 3 5 Similarly, Rosalie Abella postulated that
section 28 "means that in interpreting the onus on a respondent to justify
the reasonableness of a limit to an otherwise guaranteed right, gender
equality is an immutable right."36 According to Catharine MacKinnon,
"Anti-subordination could be the distinctive guiding interpretive principle
of section 28.""3 There was an impressive array of feminists anticipating a
strong and meaningful section 28.
Despite these great hopes for section 28, it would seem that the
critics were more accurate in their predictions of its impact. Section 28 is
seldom alluded to in current Charter literature and cases. In my search, I
was able to find only twelve Supreme Court of Canada cases in which
section 28 was mentioned. The majority of these were sexual assault cases
in which the reference to section 28 was found in the following frequently
quoted passage from Justice Cory in Osolin: "The provisions of ss. 15 and
28 of the Charter guaranteeing equality to men and women, although not
determinative should be taken into account in determining the reasonable
limitations that should be placed upon the cross-examination of a
complainant."38 As in Osolin, the reference to section 28 is almost always
in conjunction with section 15, confirming the critics' perception that
section 28 added nothing beyond what was already provided by section 15.
I found only three cases in which section 28 received any discussion
separate and distinct from section 15. In NWAC, the only one of these cases
in which the Court dealt at any length with section 28, Justice Sopinka,
having dismissed the section 28 argument in relation to section 2(b) of the
Charter, made the point that it would have been better characterized as a
section 15 argument, which he then dismissed as failing on the same basis.39
The other two references to section 28 alone were contained in single
35 Eberts, supra note 32 at 216.
36 Supra note 24 at 232.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Making Sex Equality Real" in Lynn Smith, ed., Righting the
Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights" (Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1986) 37 at
41.
38 R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 at 669 [Osolin].
39 NWAC, supra note 20 at 665. The Federal Court of Appeal decision in this case providing a
declaration that the federal government had restricted the freedom of expression of Aboriginal
women, thus violating their section 2(b) and 28 Charter rights, is one of few decisions in which section
28 grounded an equality decision. This decision was overturned on appeal.
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sentences of little substance.4 °
There has been no engagement in the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada with the question of what, if anything, section 28 adds in
terms of equality protection for women (or for men). It is interesting to
speculate why this happened-whether section 28 was seldom invoked and
accordingly has languished forgotten and untested; whether groups were
unable to come up with a distinctive section 28 argument; whether it was
eclipsed and made redundant by stronger section 15 jurisprudence than was
anticipated; whether judicial discomfort and/or uncertainty about section
28 led to its abandonment; or whether women's groups developed
discomfort about the apparent privileging of sex discrimination claims over
other forms of discrimination.41
In the early days of the Charter, feminists who saw it as a potentially
positive vehicle for raising and challenging issues of concern to women
were fairly uniform in their descriptions of what they were looking for in
section 15. Feminist academics promoted an interpretation of equality that
focused on effects, inequality, and context, that was itself fluid and open
41
and that understood equality as relational rather than comparative.43 While
cognizant of the risks involved, feminists tended to respond to the
indeterminacy of equality as an opportunity for putting forward a radical
vision of equality, rather than seeing it exclusively as a cloak for elitist self-
perpetuation. Similarly, feminists' response to the critiques of abstractness,
individualism, and false universals was to call for a contextual analysis that
focused on particularized, group-based inequality. In other words, feminists
generally seemed more interested in trying to make the Charter work than
in wholesale rejection of it. McIntyre ascribes this more positive approach
to the Charter to feminist activism and ongoing engagement in political
struggle as part of feminists' daily lives, such that "declaring any dominant
institution, including rights discourse and rights litigation, unambiguously
40 See R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, Wilson J. [Hess] and R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577,
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting [Seaboyerl.
41 The question of the demise of section 28 is intriguing and worthy of a much fuller exploration
but, sadly, I cannot dally with it any further in this article.
42 See e.g. Christine Boyle and Sheila Noonan, "Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal
Equality" (1986) 10 Dal. L.J. 225; Diana Majury, "Equality and Discrimination According to the
Supreme Court of Canada" (1991) 4 C.J.W.L. 407; and Sheppard, supra note 34.
43 Dianne Pothier, "Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People's Real Experiences"
(2001) 13 C.J.W.L. 37; Nitya lyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social
Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179.
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off-limits is indefensible in theory as in practice."44 As McIntyre asserts, this
willingness to engage is always, and necessarily, accompanied by deep
ambivalence and discomforting awareness of the risks of such involvement.
The critique of Charter rights as symmetrical and universal is
particularly apropos with respect to section 15, given that it is intended to
address issues involving asymmetrical power. In relation to this issue, Judy
Fudge describes the situation of women having had to expend major time,
energy, and money to defend against men's equality-based challenges to
legislation that women had previously spent years fighting to attain as "the
ultimate paradox of the Charter."45 The concern with symmetry is that, with
the exception of disability, the grounds are set out in neutral terms, that is,
as Sheppard describes it:
... in ways that obscure the historical and continuing realities of inequality facing the
subordinated group or groups within each ground. Thus, in terms of the formal language
of anti-discrimination law, discrimination on the basis of sex extends parallel, symmetrical
protection to both men and women. Discrimination on the basis of race protects both
minority and majority. 6
Although I am not aware of the argument that section 15 should be
applied exclusively to subordinated groups having been made explicitly,47
feminists have certainly argued against the symmetrical application of the
equality guarantee. Andrews, the first Supreme Court of Canada decision
on section 15, with its contextualizing language of historical disadvantage,
vulnerability, and lack of political power, went some way toward
unbalancing the symmetry of section 15. Going beyond the individualized
assessment, Lynn Smith has suggested the imposition of a different
standard when the challenged provision worsens the situation of a
McIntyre, supra note 5 at 46.
Judy Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social Transformation?" (1990) 5 C.J.L.S. 47
at 58; see also Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989).
46 Colleen Sheppard, "Grounds of Discrimination: Towards an Inclusive and Contextual
Approach" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 893 at 908.
47 One of the most obvious problems with such an approach is that it assumes that it is always
clear which is the subordinated group. Such a clear-cut distinction between oppressed and oppressor
is belied by our complex and multiple identities and issues of intersectional discrimination. The
possibility of excluding the dominant group from section 15 protection in relation to the sex ground
was explicitly rejected by Justice McLachlin in Hess, supra note 40 at 943-44: "There is no suggestion
in that language [in Turpin] that men should be excluded from protection under s. 15 because they do
not constitute a 'discrete and insular minority' disadvantaged independently of the legislation under
consideration." She relied on section 28 to support this conclusion and proceeded to find a breach of
section 15.
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disadvantaged person than when it is prejudicial to a member of an
advantaged group.4" Others have suggested that the symmetry problem
could be overcome, or at least diminished, by a focus on groups rather than
on the neutral grounds.
A further concern with the grounds set out in section 15 is whether
they are capable of addressing situations of intersectional discrimination.
The issue of intersectional discrimination was almost completely absent in
the early feminist writings on the Charter. Since those days, intersectional
discrimination as a critical component of any equality analysis has been
powerfully brought to the foreground through the writings and advocacy of
women of colour.49 Anti-discrimination/equality law must be capable of
responding effectively to the complex and intersectional discrimination that
many people experience; to the extent that it fails to do so, the law itself is
discriminatory. The concern has been raised that a grounds-based approach
to discrimination may not be capable of addressing intersectional
discrimination-that, at best, grounds of discrimination would allow one to
argue the discrimination as sex plus race and/or disability and/or sexual
orientation, that is multiple, not intersectional, discrimination. In response
to this problem, Nitya Iyer has recommended a relational approach that
addresses all of the potential grounds of discrimination, rather than
focusing on the characteristics of the individual complainant. 0 Others have
argued that a focus on specific groups, rather than on the more generalized
grounds, would be more amenable to an intersectional analysis.5' Justice
Claire L'Heureux-Dub unsuccessfully tried to persuade her fellow
Supreme Court justices that an approach focusing on identifying the
relevant subgroup(s) that have been subjected to exploitation was
preferable to relying solely on the water-tight compartments of a grounds-
48 C. Lynn Smith, "Judicial Interpretation of Equality Rights under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: Some Clear and Present Dangers" (1988) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 65 at 93-94.
49 See e.g. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics" (1989) U.
Chicago Legal F. 139; tyer, supra note 43; Nitya Duclos, "Disappearing Women: Racial Minority
Women in Human Rights Cases" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 25; and Carol A. Aylward, Canadian Critical Race
Theory: Racism and the Law (Halifax: Fernwood, 1999).
5ODuclos, ibid.; see also Jennifer Nedelsky & Craig Scott, "Constitutional Dialogue" in Joel
Bakan & David Schneiderman, eds., SocialJustice and the Constitution: Perspectives on a Social Union
for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992) 59.
51 See e.g. Anna Pellatt's discussion of the group-based argument that the Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund [LEAF] put forward in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [Vriend], in
Anna S. Pellatt, "Equality Rights Litigation and Social Transformation: A Consideration of the
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund's Intervention in Vriend v. R." (2000) 12 C.J.W.L. 117.
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based approach.52 Dianne Pothier, in response to Justice L'Heureux-Dub6,
has argued that we should not move away from grounds to groups, but
rather should engage in a more sophisticated grounds-based analysis that
recognizes grounds as historical markers of discrimination that raise
suspicion when invoked.53 As Pothier has commented, this is not a matter
of oppositional approaches, but rather a question of how to make grounds
and groups work together.
An assessment of women, equality rights, and the Charter must
address questions relating to intersectional discrimination as a central
concern. Tellingly, this is a bit difficult given the limited number of
complainant groups that have come before the Supreme Court of Canada,
as well as the limited ways in which their cases have been framed.
C. On the Decision Makers
One issue that many of the general discussions of the Charter
largely ignore is the differences among the judges.54 As discussed above, the
power accorded unelected, unaccountable judges under the Charter is one
of the principal critiques emanating from the male left. There is a tendency
among these critics to lump all judges together as sharing a single judicial
ideology that aligns them with the social and economic elite.55 Feminists,
however, have shown considerable interest and see considerable
significance in gender differences among judges.56 This is not surprising for
a number of reasons. Advocating for more women/feminist judges, as well
as male judges from other subordinated groups, has been a priority for
many feminists. Women judges themselves have commented on the
52 See Justice L'Heureux-Dub 's dissent in Egan v. Canada, [19951 2 S.C.R. 513 [Egan].
53 Pothier, supra note 43.
54 However, for an article that is all about differences among Supreme Court of Canada judges,
see Marc Gold, "Of Rights and Roles: The Supreme Court and the Charter" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev.
507.
55 See e.g. Bakan, supra note 13 at 319. While there is no question that judges, almost by
definition, are members of the social and economic elite in Canada, this does not preclude judges, like
law professors, from having a class consciousness. Additionally, class is only one piece of a multiple
and complex identity and is not determinative of one's ideology.
56 There are as of yet so few Aboriginal and racialized judges that it is difficult to do anything
more than speculate about the positive differences that thesejudges would bring and the personal cost
to these judges. See e.g. R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484.
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gendered dynamics of judging." To date, the women judges on the
Supreme Court have generally been more open and courageous in their
equality analysis than their male colleagues. Women are recent entrants to
the judicial arena, as they have been somewhat less recent entrants to the
legal community and to academia. There are strong parallels among the
subordinating experiences of feminist lawyers, feminist academics, and
feminist judges that feminist scholars understand must have an impact on
their judicial decision making.58 And finally, as the cases discussed below
demonstrate, there have been some striking gender splits in Supreme Court
of Canada decisions, particularly on sex equality issues, that have certainly
not escaped feminists' notice. While these women-only dissents are
disappointing because they are dissents, they are at the same time
affirming; they speak strongly to the importance of dissent judgments.59
There seems to be a commonly held view that unanimous decisions
by the Supreme Court are the most desirable. According to Marc Gold, for
example, "it would be bizarre and undesirable if efforts were not made to
maximize those occasions where the Court could speak with one voice."6°
However, the costs exacted by forced unanimity can be high, as evidenced
by the painstaking contortions and watering down of positions that seem to
have gone into the creation of the Law6 1 decision as a consensus of the
Court. In some areas, the certainty and clarity that a unanimous Supreme
Court decision can bring to bear on a fraught legal issue may well be a
57
See e.g. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?"
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 and Justice Maryka Omatsu, "On Judicial Appointments: Does
Gender Make a Difference?" in Joseph F. Fletcher, ed., Ideas in Action: Essays on Politics and Law in
Honour of Peter Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 176.
58 See Constance Backhouse, "The Chilly Climate for Women Judges" (Paper presented to the
"Adding Feminism to Law: The Contributions of Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6" workshop,
Ottawa, September 2002) and Hester Lessard, "Farce or Tragedy?: Judicial Backlash and Justice
McClung" (1999) 10 Const. Forum Const. 65.
See generally The Honourable Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of
the Future?" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 495.
60 Supra note 54 at 508. This is an interesting statement from Gold given that his conclusions in
this article espouse the contrary view and resonate with my views that split decisions and dissents in
Charter cases are positive.
61 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [ 1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law], Beverley
Baines, "Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality" (2000) 11 Const. Forum Const. 65 at 67, describes the
consensus as "... a bland, pedantic portrayal of judicial unanimity," as compared to earlier (and later)
"... robust factionalism .... While it lasted, the Law consensus led to problematic decisions like
Lovelace v. Ontario (A. G.), [20001 1 S.C.R. 950 and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [2000] I S.C.R. 703. However, the consensus was short-lived as evidenced by the split
decision in Lavoie v. Canada, 2002 SCC 23 [Lavoie] that followed not long after.
2002]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 40, NOS. 3 & 4
desirable goal, in the interests of both law and society. But this is not
necessarily true with respect to a fundamental rights document, like the
Charter, and particularly in relation to such an amorphous concept as
equality rights, where consensus is likely to be either fleeting or case
specific or to reflect a compromised vision and approach.
I think we should look more positively on split Charter decisions
and dissents. I am often the most disappointed in and wary of unanimous
decisions. The desire for unanimous decisions reflects a positivist
understanding of law, the idea that the correct interpretation is lying in wait
to be found. Such a desire is at odds with the more sophisticated and
complex understandings of law generally held by social justice scholars and
activists. Multiple judgments more fully reflect our plurality and usually
provide a fuller and deeper canvassing of the issues and problems. Multiple
judgments may provide better direction to legislatures required to
implement the court's decision. According to Gold, "[t]o the extent that a
further value of the Charter lies in the fact that it precipitates a dialogue
between court and legislature, the divisions on the Court can be seen to
contribute to a more realistic, flexible and less dogmatic dialogue on issues
of rights."62 Dissents provide hope for those whose rights have not been
recognized by the majority. Gays and lesbians have, for example, drawn
strength and determination from the strong dissents in cases like Mossop 63
and Egan, and, with that vision before them, they continued to push to have
the discrimination that they face finally acknowledged by the majority in
Vriend. In the slow incremental process that is law reform, it is often true
that today's dissent is tomorrow's majority.64 This may be particularly the
case in areas like equality jurisprudence where we all have a huge amount
to learn and integrate into our thinking. As much as I would prefer it if
more of the decisions that I agree with were in the majority rather than the
dissent, my sense is that a shift to greater consensus and unanimity among
members of the Court would mean that the views and positions that I
support would become increasingly muted and ultimately invisible.
If one accepts that the significance of Charter cases goes far beyond
the specific outcome in the case, then multiple decisions provide much
62 Supra note 54 at 529.
63 Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop, [ 1993]1 S.C.R. 554 [Mossopl; Egan,supra note 52; and Vriend, supra
note 51.
64 Sadly, this may be more true than I would like to admit and we may see the positive Charter
decisions of the last few years become dissents in future cases. For example, the Supreme Court's
recent decision in R. v. Shearing, 2002 SCC 58 [Shearing], is, in my view, a troubling retreat from its
earlier decision in R. v. Mills, [19991 3 S.C.R. 668 [Mills].
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more fertile ground for public education, mobilizing, and political action.
Charter decisions are about interpretation, values, and beliefs; it is no
wonder that consensus is rare. As the diversity of the Supreme Court
expands, we can anticipate greater diversity of perspective and analysis; we
should look forward to greater and stronger disagreements and to more
concurring and dissenting opinions. The benefits to be derived from
academic debate about the Charter that I referred to at the beginning of
this article apply similarly, in my view, to judicial debate about the Charter.
While some argue that the rights in the Charter "mask fundamental social
and political conflicts"65 under an appearance of shared values and
consensus, I think the opposite: that Charter rights provide the impetus and
grounding to bring these conflicts out into the open-in the court room, in
the legislatures, and in the streets. Rather than simply reflecting and
reinforcing the established values of the legal system and legal elites, the
Charter equality guarantee provides a basis from which to try to depose
formal equality and individualism from their entrenched positions as
dominant values.
II. THE CASES
I do not intend to discuss, or even refer to, all of the Supreme Court
of Canada decisions in which the "sex" ground of section 15 was before the
Court because they are not necessarily the most significant sex equality or
Charter equality cases.66 Despite the advent of section 15 of the Charter, a
number of the most important Supreme Court of Canada cases for women
over the past twenty years were not Charter cases6 7 or, although Charter
cases, were not brought or decided as equality cases.68 This lack of
65 Petter & Hutchinson, supra note 14 at 536.
66 For a comprehensive examination of section 15 cases, see Sheilah Martin, "Balancing
Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299.
6 7 See e.g. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., 11989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (pregnancy discrimination) and
Janzen v. Platy Enterpises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 [Janzen] (sexual harassment). For a more recent
case see British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia
Government and Service Employees' Union, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [BCGSEU] (aerobic standards for forest
firefighters).
68 See e.g. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentaler] (abortion) which was brought and
decided as a section 7 Charter case, although section 15 was discussed. Section 28 was raised as part
of the constitutional questions that were before the Court and was argued by LEAF in its intervenor's
factum, but section 28 was not referred to in any one of the four separate judgments that were issued
by the Court. See LEAF, Equality and the Charter: Ten Years of Feminist Advocacy Before the Supreme
Court of Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1996).
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centrality for section 15 can be seen either positively or negatively. It could
be read as support for the argument that equality is an empty, meaningless
concept and that section 15 is too abstract and open-ended~to be of
concrete assistance to women. Section 15 is not central in all of the cases
and decisions of greatest significance to women, because equality is not
central to the betterment of women's lives. On the other hand, it could be
that the impact of the Charter and section 15 is much more diffuse and
relational-that the Court's understanding of substantive equality for
women is filtering into its judgments, lower courts' decisions, and the
arguments and expectations of those who appear before the courts. The
analysis of substantive equality is not contained by or within the Charter or
even in the explicit language of equality. Given the similarities in wording
and intent, human rights anti-discrimination provisions have, from the
beginning, had a strong, interactive relationship with section 15 of the
Charter. Initially, human rights jurisprudence was employed to steer the
Court away from the formal equality model. At the same time, section 15
has presented opportunities to break out of some of the quagmire that was
impeding the human rights provisions.69 This dialectical relationship
continues, largely to the benefit of both human rights and Charter analysis.
This diffuse impact of section 15 may, to a limited extent and on a practical
level, mitigate the restriction of the Charter's application to state action; the
Charter is, at least indirectly, affecting the private sector. But the fact that
such impact is indirect and "private" may at the same time serve to
reinforce the public/private dichotomy on the symbolic level.
I will discuss the cases under the following substantive headings:
reproduction, violence against women, family, employment, and socio-
economic claims, recognizing that these categories overlap significantly and
do not account for all of the cases.
A. Reproduction
Abortion is one area in which our elected representatives and the
institution of democracy have shown themselves remarkably undemocratic.
Neither federal nor provincial governments under a range of leaderships
were willing to introduce legislation to eliminate (federal) or circumvent
(provincial) the Criminal Code7° restrictions on abortion that were in effect
until 1988. No government was willing to go out on the political limb of
69 For example, the impossible distinction between direct and indirect discrimination that was
finally dismantled in BCGSEU, supra note 67.
70 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 251.
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respecting and supporting a woman's right to choose abortion, despite the
fact that the majority of Canadians support such a position. Politicians
apparently feared taking sides on such a highly charged issue and risking
the ire of voters for whom this would be a decisive factor. The fact that the
federal government has only made a single, feeble attempt to reintroduce
restrictions on abortion since the Supreme Court struck down the Criminal
Code provision on abortion indicates that this fear, now operating in
reverse, and not a principled position on the issue of abortion, was likely
the inhibiting factor for a number of politicians. Before the advent of the
Charter, pro-choice advocates were stalled by governments' unwillingness
to act; the Charter opened the door for movement forward on this issue.
There have been at least three Charter cases dealing with abortion,
all of which were among the early Charter cases to come before the
Supreme Court of Canada.7' Abortion is quintessentially a gender-specific
issue. As such, and because its genesis is biological, abortion gives rise to
the dangers of essentialist argument and decision making. Is it possible to
ground the gender-specific argument in a social context that reflects the
role played by biological difference without essentializing it? Is this a sex
equality argument? Is it a section 15 argument? From an anti-choice
perspective, the issue is solely the recognition of fetal rights; gender is
irrelevant because the woman is irrelevant. From a fathers' rights
perspective, often articulated in conjunction with the fetal rights position
but actually in some ways contradictory to it, the issue is gender equality
based on a formal equality model. This is a somewhat difficult argument to
mount. Given the biological differences between a pregnant woman and a
man who self-defines as a parent, it is difficult to see the likeness between
the two on which the formal equality model could be imposed.
The decision in Morgentaler is, in terms of its outcome, a huge step
forward for women. The decision struck down the Criminal Code
prohibition of abortion and eliminated the humiliating, delaying, and
inequitable process that women were required to undergo in order to
71 The other two Supreme Court decisions on abortion have not added to or revised the extensive
discussion of the issues in Morgentaler. Borowski v. Canada (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, an action to
strike down subsections of the Criminal Code abortion provision so as to leave only the prohibition of
abortion standing, was found to be moot in light of the Morgentaler decision. Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989]
2 S.C.R. 530 raised the issue of the right of the would-be father of the fetus to be granted an injunction
against the pregnant woman seeking an abortion. The father's claim was dismissed under Quebec's
Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-1 2, and the federal Charter was held not to apply to
a private claim. In addition, there have been other cases addressing reproductive issues. R. v. Sullivan,
[19911 1 S.C.R. 489 dealt with the status of a fetus in the context of criminal charges laid against
midwives; Winnipeg Childand Family Services (NorthwestArea) v. D.F. G., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 dealt with
the application of child protection provisions to a fetus.
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obtain a legal abortion in Canada. The decision, however, is what Fudge
describes as a "narrow ... victory"72 in that it did nothing to resolve any of
the myriad problems that deny many women access to safe abortion in
Canada. Given the procedural focus of the section 7 analysis, the case
contains a great deal of discussion about access problems, but there is no
reference to the socio-economic context of these access issues that have a
disproportionate and negative impact on poor and low-income women.
Morgentaler does lay some foundation for these arguments, and the
decision is a necessary first step in ending the legislative stalemate so that
the issue of the state's obligation to provide access to abortion services can
be pursued on the political front, as well as possibly through litigation.
In terms of analyzing and recognizing women's equality rights, the
case is disappointing, posits some problematic propositions, largely avoids
the most difficult questions, and offers few rays of hope. It is narrowly
focused; there is no discussion of the forced abortions to which young
women, racialized women, women with disabilities, and poor women are
frequently subjected. As one would expect, the Court was divided on both
outcome and approach to the issue. There were four different judgments
issued, with Justice Bertha Wilson, the lone woman on the Court, the only
one to stand alone in her judgment. The case was decided on the basis of
section 7 of the Charter-the right to life, liberty, and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived of any of these except in accordance with
principles of fundamental justice. The Crown's primary argument in
support of the legislation was one of deference. All of the judges accepted
that the state has an interest in the protection of the fetus but none felt
obliged in the context of this particular case to fully investigate that interest
or to determine what limits, if any, that interest might justify imposing upon
a pregnant woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Justice Wilson
went the furthest in this discussion, proposing that the state's interest in
protecting the fetus is greater at later stages of pregnancy.
Pro-choice supporters, understandably, have been concerned by this
recognition of a state interest in protecting the fetus and fear the
repercussions for women. So far, fetal rights arguments have been pursued
in a number of different contexts but have not ultimately been successful.7 3
I share these concerns. At the same time, feminist analyses of abortion have
developed beyond a simplistic choice argument to recognize the
complications of race, class, and disability and to acknowledge the difficult
and painful dilemma that the abortion decision presents for most women.
72 Fudge, supra note 45 at 55.
See cases supra note 71.
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Differing views about the fetus are part of this dilemma and need to be
incorporated into feminist abortion analysis. I am more concerned by the
language in Morgentaler of balancing the state's interest in protecting the
fetus against the rights of the pregnant woman. To see these rights as in
conflict rather than as inextricably interrelated undermines the pregnant
woman's bodily integrity and autonomy.
The section 15 argument that the Criminal Code prohibition of
abortion, except in limited circumstances, infringed women's equality rights
was summarily dismissed by the two dissenting judges in Morgentaler and
not addressed by the other judges. Unavoidably, the language throughout
refers to women and to pregnant women, but, with the exception of Justice
Wilson, this was not enough to induce the Court to address abortion as a
gendered issue and to inquire into the sex equality implications of the
impugned law. 4 In a passage that has been extensively quoted by feminists
and is hailed as a Charter high point by many, Justice Wilson provided a
powerful discussion of the gendered nature of the abortion decision:
This decision is one that will have profound psychological, economic and social
consequences for the pregnant woman. The circumstances giving rise to it can be complex
and varied and there may be, and usually are, powerful considerations militating in opposite
directions. It is a decision that deeply reflects the way the woman thinks about herself and
her relationship to others and to society at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a
profound social and ethical one as well. Her response to it will be the response of the whole
person.
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a dilemma not
just because it is outside the realm of his personal experience (although this is, of course,
the case) but because he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the
subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.7"
Justice Wilson directly places this discussion in the context of
women's struggle for human rights, not as part of the earlier struggle to fit
into the man's world, but as part of women's more recent struggle to
recreate societal structures to include their needs and aspirations. In this
context, "[t]he right to reproduce or not to reproduce ... is one such
[protected] right and is properly perceived as an integral part of modern
woman's struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human being." 6 In
74 This disturbing reluctance on the part of the Court to explicitly frame an issue as one of sex
equality, even when a substantive sex equality analysis is applied, runs throughout the Charter cases.
For a recent example, see Shearing, supra note 64, where the issue is framed exclusively as one of
privacy rather than one of sex equality.
75 Morgentaler, supra note 68 at 171.
76 Ibid. at 172.
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this discussion of abortion, Justice Wilson meets the difficult challenge of
grounding the gender-specific argument in a social context that reflects the
role played by biological difference without essentializing it. Although she
does not engage in this discussion in relation to sections 15 or 28, this is one
of the best and strongest articulations of a substantive equality analysis that
we have had from the Court to date. It is contextual, focused on inequality,
and premised on women's experiences. The context is the human rights
context of women's inequality and the history of women's struggle to be
admitted as distinct persons within that context. There is no need for a
comparator group; in fact, attempts to find a comparator group would
undermine this analysis. Substantive equality is about recreating society and
societal structures to incorporate "differences," not to distort them,
appropriate them, reject them through objectification or denial, merely
"accommodate" them, or assess them against some presumably "un-
different" comparator group.
B. Violence Against Women
Violence against women is probably the area in which section 15
has been most frequently argued before the Supreme Court of Canada.
From the early decision in Hess, challenging the constitutionality of the
gender-specific absolute liability offence of sexual intercourse with a girl
under fourteen, to the most recent decision in Shearing, relating to the
cross-examination of a complainant in a sexual assault trial on her diary
entries, there have been at least a dozen sexual assault cases in which sex
equality has been referred to and has clearly informed the analysis.77 Most
of these cases involve the admissibility and use of confidential records
relating to the complainant. If pornography is included as a form of
violence against women, the number of Supreme Court Charter cases in this
area rises to fifteen.78
Sexual assault is an area where there has been much interchange
77 It is perhaps self-serving to say this because I have been an active participant in the work of
LEAF since its inception in 1985. But I think that the Court's positive movement over the course of
these sexual assault cases and its greater, albeit hesitant and not unanimous understanding of the
gendered nature of the problems that infect the law's handling of sexual assault are in large part due
to the arguments LEAF has put forward in its interventions in these cases and its related advocacy work.
It intervened before the Supreme Court in over half of the sexual assault cases and in two of the three
pornography cases.
78 As there is a separate article on sexual assault and the Charter in this issue, I will make only
a few general comments on the topic. See Lise Gotell, "The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant,
and the Disclosure of Confidential Records: The Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault Law"
(2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 251.
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between the courts and Parliament, a situation that existed before the
Charter79 and has continued throughout the time of the Charter. The
relationship has generally been one of Parliament providing some
protection to women against the evidentiary abuses to which they have
been subjected in sexual assault trials and the courts clawing back some of
these protections in the name of the fair trial rights of the accused. Over
time, Parliament has become more explicit in its equality rationale for these
provisions. Amendments to the Criminal Code relating to sexual assault
made in the last ten years have each contained a preamble that explains the
gendered social context that gives rise to sexual assault and the gender
issues that need to be taken into consideration in applying the new
legislation."0 Somewhat reluctantly, at least for some justices, the Supreme
Court of Canada increasingly has been willing to explore the gendered
assumptions and values underlying the evidentiary issues. This process
culminated in the almost unanimous" decision in Mills in which the
statutory protocols for the admission of confidential records pertaining to
the complainant in a sexual assault trial were upheld. However, the more
recent decision in Shearing represents a step backwards. The majority ruled
that the accused could not cross-examine the complainant on the absence
of entries in her diary relating to the abuse in order to raise the
presumption that if it was not recorded it must not have happened. Then,
in a sleight of hand, the majority ruled that the accused can cross-examine
the complainant on the absence of entries in her diary in order to test the
accuracy and completeness of her recollection of the events around the
time that she was abused.82
It is impossible to know yet whether Shearing is an aberration or the
beginning of a backslide into ignoring or downplaying women's equality
interests in the context of sexual assault trials. I fear that the Court believes
that it has now purged itself and the law of the erroneous and damaging
assumptions, myths, and stereotypes about women's sexuality and women's
reactions to having been raped that infused the rules of evidence and have
7 9 See Christine Boyle, SexualAssault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984).
80 See An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c.38; An Act to amend the
Criminal Code (self-induced intoxication), S.C. 1995, c.32; and An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(production of records in sexual offence proceedings), S.C. 1997, c.30. These lengthy preambles refer
explicitly to the prevalence of sexual violence against women and children and to the particularly
disadvantageous impact of violence on the equal participation of women and children in society and
on the Charter rights of women and children, with specific mention of sections 7, 15, and 28.
81 Justice Lamer dissented in part.
82 Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and Gonthier dissented on this point.
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continued to infect defence presentation and judicial decision making long
after the rules were revised.83 I fear that the Court will no longer feel the
need to engage in a rigorous sex equality analysis in this area and will tune
out these arguments when presented by counsel. I fear that the Court
believes it has eliminated the sexual inequalities relating to sexual assault
such that it can now revert to being dealt with as a gender neutral-offence.
These fears are greatly exacerbated by the retirement of Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6, who has been a champion of women's equality rights. Her sexual
assault judgments, often in dissent, are wonderfully affirming for feminist
advocates who work on this issue. She gradually has pushed the Court to
be able to understand and accept a gendered equality analysis in this area.
Section 15 provided the foundation for a judge to publicly recognize, as did
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, that:
Parliament exhibited a marked, and justifiedly so, distrust of the ability of the courts to
promote and achieve a non-discriminatory application of the law in this area [sexual assault]
.... My attempt to illustrate the tenacity of these discriminatory beliefs and their acceptance
at all levels of society clearly demonstrates that discretion in judges is antithetical to the
goals of Parliament."
Justice L'Heureux-Dub has paid a huge price, in terms of vicious
and personalized critique and public scorn, for her outspoken support for
women's equality rights, particularly in the sexual assault context. With this
kind of public controversy swirling around a sex-equality analysis in the
context of rape, it is hard to credit the argument that the Charter
depoliticizes the issues that come under its shadow.
C. Family Law
All family law cases are sex equality cases, including those arising
between lesbians or gay men or involving bisexuals or transgendered
persons. By this I mean that the family is a thoroughly gendered institution;
it is premised on a gendered division of labour that permeates every aspect
of family life. This is our inheritance-the family as fundamentally a gender
construct from which it is very difficult to escape. The law has reflected and
perpetuated the gendered family and only recently has there been a
83 Justice McClung's decision in R. v. Ewanchuk, [1998] 6 W.W.R. 8 (Alta. C.A.), and the
responses it generated are glaring examples that these anti-woman views are still very much in
operation among judges and among the public.
84 Seaboyer, supra note 40 at 707. See also Lessard, supra note 58 and Joanne Wright, "Consent
and Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse: Reflections on Ewanchuk" (2001) 16 C.J.L.S. 173.
2002] The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women
concerted effort, led by feminists, to introduce equality into the family and
into family law. Ironically, those efforts have led to a gender-neutral
approach to family law that belies its underlying gendered foundation, as
well as the gender-based expectations and assumptions that inform our
readings of the family. We are seeking to impose a gender-neutral solution
on a gendered problem, all the while still trapped in our own gendered
assumptions and judgments.
I am going to focus my discussion of the Charter and family law
almost exclusively on the opinions in M. v. H.s5 because they reflect an
interesting and important debate over the gendered nature of family law
that has potentially far-reaching implications for future sex equality-based
claims. In this case, M. brought a section 15 challenge against the definition
of "spouse" in Ontario's Family Law Act 6 that had the effect of extending
the right to support upon relationship breakdown to members of opposite-
sex couples but not to same-sex couples. The challenge, brought on the
analogous ground of sexual orientation, was successful in overturning the
heterosexual definition of spouse.87 Although the action was between two
separated lesbian partners, the fact that the parties were both women was
not a factor in the case. 8 Gender was, however, a major subtext. Gender
8 5 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 [M. v. H.].
86 R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3.
87 The decision is emphatically limited to this narrow ground. The frequency with which the
Court insists that this case is not about the right to marry-that this appeal "has nothing to do with
marriage per se," that marital rights and obligations "play no part in this analysis," that "there is no
need to consider whether same-sex couples can marry," all statements made within a single page (at
48-49) and as part of the introduction to the section 15 analysis-is staggering. The decision clearly
has implications for the right to marry and will be used to further the argument for that right. While
this case does not decide that issue, it is not unrelated to it, as is clear from Justice Gonthier's dissent
and his concern that "a constitutionally mandated expansion of the definition of spouse would open
the door to a raft of other claims" (at 90) and from Justice Bastarache's comments relating to the
possibility that the implications of the decision in this case may be greater than initially anticipated (at
157). The Court's discomfort with the homosexual marriage question is palpable and disconcerting,
and is indicative of the entrenched position of the institution of heterosexual marriage. But the Court
will have to deal with the right of gays and lesbians to marry and I sincerely hope that when it does,
there is a gender analysis brought to bear on the question. The right to marry is a contentious issue
among lesbian feminists because marriage has been, and arguably still is, an oppressive institution for
women. From my perspective, a gendered analysis leads to the conclusion that it is not appropriate for
the state to endorse marriage for anyone at all. This would leave the right to marry open to anyone but
would divest it of legal significance. The state would continue to apportion rights and obligations
incurred as a result of intimate and other relationships in which economic dependency may arise.
88 1 think that this is appropriate-the fact that this was a lesbian couple, not a gay male couple,
is irrelevant to the analysis. But I do think that the question of the potential relevance and impact on
the suspect categories of discrimination should always be asked as an essential component of a
substantive equality analysis.
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enters into the case in the discussions of the purpose behind the state
requiring that in some circumstances one party pay support to the other
upon relationship breakdown. Justice Peter Cory, writing for a majority
that included both women on the Court, made the following statement:
It is true that women in common law relationships often tended to become financially
dependent on their male partners because they raised their children and because of their
unequal earning power. But the legislature drafted s. 29 [the definition of spouse at issue]
to allow either a man or a woman to apply for support, thereby recognizing that financial
dependence can arise in an intimate relationship in a context entirely unrelated either to
child rearing or to any gender-based discrimination existing in our society. 9
While Justice Cory's caveat is accurate, it does not detract from the
fact that the need for spousal support flows primarily from the gendered
division of labour within the family and from gender inequities outside the
family.9" There is no need to de-gender the analysis of support in order to
extend the right of support to lesbians, just as, for example, there is no need
to de-gender the analysis of sexual harassment in order to recognize that it
can and does occur on a same-sex basis.9'
Justice Frank lacobucci, in his half of the majority judgment dealing
with section 1 of the Charter, uses the family law reforms that feminists
fought for to justify his contention that the support provisions are no longer
premised on gender inequalities, that is, that the gender problem has been
fixed.92 This is a classic example of some progress on an issue masking the
continuing existence of the problem. This position demonstrates the
critique of the Charter as being infused with an ideology of formal equality
that functions so as to neutralize ongoing inequalities. However, as Justice
lacobucci's discussion reflects, the critique is not unique to the Charter but
is a function of the incremental progress itself. The same problem
potentially arises with respect to any gains made to improve a subordinated
group's situation such that the gain is seen as the equality solution rather
than a small step toward equality. The more successful we are on the
89 Supra note 85 at 48.
90 Contrary to the implications of Justice Cory's statement, I expect that most men who are
claiming spousal support are doing so because they have undertaken primary responsibility for the
traditionally female tasks of child and home care.
91 This is something the Supreme Court recognized in Janzen, supra note 67.
92 Supra note 85 at 64-69. For a feminist critique of these reforms as exacerbating the more
severe gender inequalities by furthering the property interests of middle- and upper-class women at
the expense of the support needs of lower-income and poor women, see Martha Fineman, The Illusion
of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
c. 3.
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preliminary issues, the more difficult it will be to get at the more
entrenched and systemic equality issues. This will be particularly true when
the equality issues involve intersectional inequalities.
Justice Charles Gonthier takes the position opposite to that
endorsed by the majority in M. v. H. and asserts that the purpose of the
legislation is exclusively related to sex:
The primary purpose of the FLA is to recognize the social function specific to opposite-sex
couples and their position as a fundamental unit in society, and to address the dynamic of
dependence unique to men and women in opposite-sex relationships. This dynamic of
dependence stems from this specific social function, the roles regularly taken by one
member of that relationship, the biological reality of the relationship, and the pre-existing
economic disadvantage that is usually, but not exclusively, suffered by women.9
Almost all of the concerns raised by the Charter critics are present
in this one judgment-biologism, essentialism, heterosexism, abstraction,
a lack of gender analysis, and a lack of equality analysis. The Charter is only
as progressive as those applying it. When judges are mired in stereotypes,
they can only perpetuate those stereotypes, even in the name of equality.
Justice Michel Bastarache is the only judge to engage in a gender
analysis of the purpose of the legislation and to acknowledge the glaring
reality of gender inequality that the legislation was designed to address. He
finds that "[t]he primary legislative purpose in extending support
obligations outside the marriage bond was to address the subordinated
position of women in non-marital relationships."94 'In this specific context,
women's subordinated position relates to their generally more vulnerable
economic situation, often worsened as a result of the relationship, leaving
them economically disadvantaged after its breakdown. However, sex is not
an absolute proxy for gender95 and other inequalities may give rise to
relationship-based economic dependencies. There is no justification for
excluding others who might similarly find themselves in a situation of
economic disadvantage related to the relationship upon its breakdown.
When that exclusion is premised on a prohibited ground of discrimination,
as in this case, the section 15 claim should be successful. Justice Bastarache
found the middle ground of gender analysis between the extreme positions
that gender is no longer relevant at one end of the spectrum and that sex
is determinative at the other end. Family law may be particularly prone to
Supra note 85 at 104.
Ibid. at 189.
95 Sex is the biological division and gender is the socially constructed division. There is significant
overlap but the terms are not synonymous.
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these extreme interpretations and it may be difficult to find that middle
gender ground. We need to be able to use the Charter to move beyond this
dichotomy to recognize the centrality, but not exclusivity, of gender as
mediated by other social factors.
It is disconcerting that the majority of the Court inM. v. H. felt the
need to de-gender support. I am concerned about what this means for
-future analysis of family law issues. Family law desperately needs a
comprehensive substantive equality analysis; it is an area in which such an
analysis would no doubt be complex and contradictory. Yet family law is an
area in which the applicability of the Charter, as well as its application, have
been held to be uncertain96 and thus where the critique that the Charter
reinforces the private/public sphere dichotomy may be apt. Although we
may not want the Charter to intervene at. the microcosmic level of
individual family disputes, we do need the Charter to apply to the legal rules
and procedures that govern those breakups to ensure that gender inequities
are addressed, not perpetuated or exacerbated. And this is one of the
places where the public/private distinction breaks down. It is an area in
which:
[t]he private sphere has been, more often than not, an area where proxies for state power
have been issued to designated actors whose status and role within the family privileges
them as enforcers or conduits for social norms and values. Men, in their roles as heads of
households-husbands and fathers-have historically employed and enjoyed reflected state
power in this regard. 7
The legal rules are not just the state-enacted laws; they are also the
assumptions and presumptions that lie behind the interpretation and
application of the law and that help create the law. These are the pieces
that are extremely difficult to get at-because they are often not
articulated, because they are so taken for granted and assumed to be true,
because they can be difficult to argue against, and because they are
"private." These are the pieces that a gender analysis needs to unpack and
that the state/law "public" focus of the Charter may sometimes protect.
D. Employment
96 See e.g. P.(D.) v. S.(C.), [199314 S.C.R. 141 and Young v. Young, [199314 S.C.R. 3, which are
confusing decisions relating to the application of the Charter to the "best interests of the child test" in
which the majority decisions were that the Charter did not apply or that there was no Charter violation.
The "best interests of the child test" is exactly the kind of positive-sounding family law rule that cries
out for a thorough gender-equality analysis.
Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century
Tragedies (New York: Routledge, 1995) at 15.
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Employment is the flip side of the family-the public sphere where
women have always been, but until recently, have been largely invisible.
The workplace, long considered man's exclusive domain, has been
modelled on the traditional male worker who, when he commences work
as an adult, does so full-time and permanently. He does not take time out
to bear or raise children, to accommodate a partner's work demands, or for
any other reason. Women have had to fight hard to be recognized as
legitimate and committed workers with perhaps different needs,
aspirations, ways of working, and priorities than their stereotyped male
counterparts.98 Every victory that women have won in the employment
context has been a begrudging accommodation of women's "differences";
there has been no revisioning of the workplace as a multi-gendered-
abilitied-raced-aged-sexual-orientationed place. Section 15 of the Charter
provides the grounding to make such revisioning arguments, but the
potential here is severely restricted by the Charter's limited application.
It is in relation to employment that the Charter's restriction to state
action is most problematic, where the myth of the public (as in
state)/private (as in sector) divide most needs to be challenged in the
interests of equality. In this era of globalization, corporations and
organizations wield as much, and some would argue even greater, power as
the state; they intervene and control people's lives and livelihoods in
significant and pernicious ways.99 The inability to use the Charter to directly
challenge the entrenched inequalities on which this power is based and
which it perpetuates is a serious shortcoming. McKinney v. University of
Guelph,'00 addressing the issue of mandatory retirement in the university
context, is a good example of the absurdity of this private/public distinction.
Over half of this 110-page decision is taken up with detailed and convoluted
discussions of whether universities constitute government for the purposes
of Charter application when it seems patently clear that the issue of
mandatory retirement is far from a "private" matter. It is a social issue of
general concern, as is evidenced by the number of cases brought before the
courts challenging mandatory retirement provisions, the extensive
discussions engaged in by the courts on the question, and the types of
98 Many men do not fit or do not want to fit the traditional male worker model either.
99 See e.g. Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Toronto: Vintage Canada,
2000).
100 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [McKinney].
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arguments put forward in its defence and in the challenges to it.1"'
The Charter's equality guarantee should be recognized as requiring
consideration of potential impacts of mandatory retirement on the range
of diverse employees. These issues were raised to a very limited extent by
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in McKinney. She rejected the all-too-frequently
made argument that a practice should be preserved simply because it is
deeply entrenched in our society, and that somehow, because of the
longevity of a specific policy or practice, we should be precluded from
inquiring into its discriminatory foundations and/or impact. Such a hands-
off approach protects the most deeply systemic and insidious forms of
inequalities by neutralizing and naturalizing them. From this point,
L'Heureux-Dub went on to address the disparate impact of mandatory
retirement policies on poor people and on women in particular:
The fact that "mandatory retirement has become part of the very fabric of the organization
of the labour market in this country" is inapposite to the present analysis in so far as it
ignores the promulgation of both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Human Rights Code, 1981 ... . The adverse effects of mandatory retirement are most
painfully felt by the poor. The elderly often face staggering financial difficulties ....
[Wlomen are particularly affected by this deficiency. Upon attaining the age of 65, women
often have either lower or no pension income since a greater proportion of them are in jobs
where they are less likely to be offered pension plan coverage. Women are more susceptible
to interrupted work histories, partly as a result of childcare responsibilities, thereby losing
potential pension coverage. Furthermore, women are prone to have lower lifetime earnings
upon which pension benefits are based.""2
Justice Wilson wrote her own reasons but expressed substantial
agreement with Justice L'Heureux- Dub6 with respect to her section 1
analysis. The two women judges were the two dissenters in this case and
would have struck down the mandatory retirement provisions, at least in
part because of their negative disparate impact on women and people with
low incomes.
It should not be surprising, given the inability to employ the Charter
to directly challenge the discriminatory employment practices of "private"
employers or to compel them to address systemic inequalities in their
workplaces, that there are very few section 15 sex equality employment
cases and that, to date, the cases that have been brought mostly deal with
101 See e.g. Saskatchewan (H. R. C.) v. Saskatoon (City of), [198912 S.C.R. 1297; DouglaslKwantlen
Faculty Association v. Douglas College, [199013 S.C.R. 570; Harrison v. University of British Columbia,
[1990]3 S.C.R. 451; Stoffman v. VancouverGeneral Hospital, [199013 S.C.R. 483; Dickason v. University
of Alberta, [199212 S.C.R. 1103.
102 Supra note 100 at 433-34 [footnotes omitted].
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employment insurance benefits.
In Schachter,"°3 the Court held that the provision of unemployment
insurance benefits to adoptive parents and not to "natural" parents
constituted a breach of section 15 of the Charter. The choice to base the
challenge on this distinction and not on the gender distinction related to
the provision of maternity benefits in the absence of paternity benefits is
interesting on a number of levels. If the section 15 claim had been based on
sex, the arguments might have been more interesting and contentious
because of the differences that exist between the biological mother and
biological father that do not exist between adoptive parents and the
biological father. While the risk of the Court opting to strike down
maternity benefits, leaving women who have just born a child vulnerable to
the demands or decisions of their employers or union negotiators, might
have been low, the consequences for women of such a decision would have
been devastating.'0 4 The comparator group chosen in Schachter was the
appropriate one, in this case, not despite but because it was the one that
gave rise to a formal equality analysis. This case puts the lie to the notion
that formal and substantive equality are in conflict and a formal equality
analysis is always a problem and to be avoided.' 5
The focus of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schachter was on
remedy. The Court's recognition of the inappropriateness of striking down
an under-inclusive positive benefit provided by the state and of reading in
as a legitimate Charter remedy was a very positive step, even while the
limited nature of that remedy was a disappointment. The Court's
unwillingness to extend state benefits was disheartening, at least for those
of us less concerned about judicial activism. Parliament chose to amend the
impugned legislation by reducing the benefits from fifteen to ten weeks and
extending them to include natural as well as adoptive parents. Equality
activists frequently argue that the equality measures we advocate will not
mean a reduction for others but are aimed only at bringing those who have
been kept behind up to the prevailing standard. That was clearly not the
case in Schachter. Biological parents benefitted but adoptive parents lost
part of their benefits. This case illustrates the need for feminist advocates
to address these issues directly and not pretend that they are cost-free. We
10 3 Schachter v. Canada, [199212 S.C.R. 679 [Schachter].
104 Women in the United States have had a terrible time attaining maternity leave protection and
paid benefits and the impact on mothers in the paid workforce has been devastating.
Possibly when there is an obvious comparator group, formal equality is the appropriate
analytic approach, and a substantive equality analysis should be applied when there is no such readily
apparent comparison and the comparative focus should be diffused or even abandoned.
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need to provide the economic analysis of where the money should come
from for the programs we advocate, not leave it to government to cut back
on existing programs to finance Charter-required programs. In these times
of tax cuts and deficit reduction as fiscal priorities, there needs to be a
countervailing voice arguing for higher taxes directed to social programs.
There are at least two section 15 Charter cases currently before the
Federal Court of Appeal challenging different aspects of the Employment
InsuranceAct.°6 on the ground of sex.'0 7 In these cases, the female plaintiffs
are claiming that the unemployment benefits scheme is the mirror image
of the male-based model of employment, premised on the same
assumptions and values and thus giving rise to similar sex-discrimination
problems. I think we can expect to see some of these cases coming before
the Supreme Court in the not too distant future. Given government
cutbacks and the impossible economic circumstances that so many women
face, there will no doubt be increased Charter challenges relating to
employment and to socio-economic issues more generally.
E. Socio-Economic Claims
While the courts have been doing poorly on socio-economic rights
claims, the legislatures have been doing worse, forcing groups to go to the
courts to seek redress against drastic government cutbacks and draconian
revisions to social programs. The courts have largely failed in providing that
redress. Poverty is one of the most glaring inequalities of Canadian
contemporary society and is intimately interrelated with the other section
15 grounds. Assumptions and stereotypes about poor people abound and
the disadvantages under which they have historically laboured are
exacerbated at every turn. But the courts have, for the most part, refused
to find socio-economic status or related economically situated inequalities
to constitute analogous grounds under section 15.08
Socio-economic rights will prove to be the most significant and
most difficult Charter battleground. They involve the assertion of positive
rights which the courts have been very reluctant to recognize. Refusal to
fully engage with these claims is refusal to engage with the disparate impact
106 S.C. 1996, c. 23.
107 Canada (A. G.) v. Lesiuk (November 2002), A-281-01 (F.C.A.) (relating to part-time workers'
eligibility for benefits) and Miller v. Canada (A.G.), 2002 FCA 370 (relating to the impact of the receipt
of maternity benefits on a woman's eligibility for regular benefits).
108 See Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, "Beyond the Social and Economic Rights Debate:
Substantive Equality Speaks to Poverty" (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 185.
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of poverty that permeates so many other Charter equality claims. As
Martha Jackman argues, the denial of such rights is itself a Charter
infringement: "traditional distinctions between classical or negative rights,
and social and economic or positive rights, and the willingness to provide
for judicial enforcement of one, but not the other, operate in fact to
discriminate against the poor."'' 9
In the Charter context, claims to socio-economic rights by people
who live in poverty are an assertion of social responsibility that, if
successful, will cost society money. Although there have been situations in
which the Court has granted a positive right and effectively required the
payment of the benefit requested, ° in the majority of such cases, the Court
has refused the application. And public sentiment is very much in accord
with this fiscal restraint, focusing on individualized self-protection, while
distancing and blaming less privileged others. Contrary to the Charter
critics, this is an area in which we need judges to be willing to be activist, to
refuse to defer to right-wing parliamentary agendas so as to allow
discriminatory programs to continue, and to take action themselves in the
social services vacuum. Some provincial human rights codes do provide
some protection against discrimination on a ground related to the receipt
of social assistance."' The painfully tortured process of the recognition of
sexual orientation as an analogous ground, based in part on its inclusion in
human rights legislation, offers some hope for the eventual recognition of
some grounds related to socio-economic status under the Charter.
However, this hotly contested recognition would largely only be
band-aid work to protect social programs relating to health, education, and
social assistance that are being eroded or dismantled. The Charter cases
brought to date have not argued for a more fundamental economic
revisioning that would seriously challenge the huge disparities in income
and wealth in this country. Some would argue that to use the Charter for
such radical purposes that are so contrary to dominant economic attitudes
would undermine the Charter's credibility and therefore its utility in
furthering more modest gains and protections; others would argue that this
is the purpose of the Charter and its guarantee of equality, and if it cannot
be employed to promote larger social justice goals, it is only shoring up a
damaged and damaging system. To date, the claims have been very modest
109 Martha Jackman, "What's Wrong with Social and Economic Rights?" (2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 235
at 243.
110 See e.g. Schachter, supra note 103 and Eldridge v. British Columbia (A. G.), [199713 S.C.R. 624.
See Falkiner v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 481
(C.A.) [Falkinerl.
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and the gains almost non-existent.
Symes"2 was a modest claim that nonetheless was unsuccessful. The
Court found that the inability of a self-employed mother to deduct her full
child care expenses as a business expense was not a violation of her section
15 equality rights. The two women judges sitting on the case dissented. This
case has been critiqued by feminists as an example of privileged women
trying to take advantage of a privileging tax system in a way that potentially
undermines the interests of other, more disadvantaged, women." 3 This
criticism is consistent with the traditional left concerns with the Charter.
But in some ways, these critiques have hampered the use of the case and
the decisions themselves to critique a tax system that concerns itself only
with horizontal equity and reinforces, and often exacerbates, vertical
inequities. The criticisms have been misdirected to the claim and the
claimant, instead of raising the larger and more fundamental critiques
implicit in the claim. The majority and dissenting opinions clearly expose
some of the inequalities of our tax system, relating to class as well as to
gender. The case can be read as either a challenge to that system or a
shoring up of that system. I prefer the former reading and, while the
challenge was only partial, and unsuccessful even at that, it laid the
groundwork for further and more extensive challenges.
A related criticism of Symes is that it was premised on a similarly
situated analysis. While this is true, it is a function of the ongoing
understanding that equality analysis requires a comparator group, a
problem from which none of the section 15 cases have broken free. The
concern that, despite the language of substantive equality, section 15
remains mired in a formal equality analysis is a legitimate one. To the
extent that the majority of the Court can make statements like the
following, that concern is painfully borne out: "[u]nfortunately proof that
women pay social costs [of child care] is not sufficient proof that women
pay child care expenses."' 4 A substantive equality analysis would make the
connection between social costs and financial outlay. However, those social
costs and the realities of working mothers' lives were a significant part of
the evidence put forward in the case and were there to be dealt with by the
judges, as well as by case commentators and social activists; the basis for a
112 Symes v. Canada, (1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [Symes].
113 See Audrey Macklin, "Symes v. M.N.R.: Where Sex Meets Class" (1992) 5 C.J.W.L. 498.
114 Symes, supra note 112 at 765.
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substantive equality analysis was there."1 5
There are a number of important social assistance cases now
coming before the Supreme Court of Canada. Gosselin,'16 an age-based
challenge to the requirement under Quebec's social assistance regulations
that single people under thirty deemed to be employable could only receive
full regular benefits if they participated in employment and training
programs, has been heard but the decision has not yet been released.
Inability, seen as a refusal to participate in these programs, reduced social
assistance benefits to $170 a month. Distinctions between the deserving
poor and the undeserving poor are becomingly increasingly overt and the
punitive measures taken against those perceived to be undeserving are
chilling. The death of Kimberly Rogers while serving her prison sentence
for welfare fraud in her own home and under a commuted lifetime ban
from social assistance, is only one of the more extreme and highly public
examples of the impact of these measures."17
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Falkiner has
been requested. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Falkiner struck down the
"spouse in the house rule" that had been eliminated by the Ontario
government in 1986 in response to a Charter challenge and then was
reintroduced in 1995. The rule derives from the expansive definition of
spouse that includes persons living together who have "a mutual agreement
or arrangement regarding their financial affairs" and for whom "the social
and familial aspects" of their relationship amount to cohabitation. The four
applicants were all single mothers who had been living with a man in a "try-
on" relationship for less than a year. The imposition of the "a man living in
the house is defined as a spouse" rule had the effect of deeming the
applicants to be in spousal relationships of presumed economic
interdependence and, on this basis, reducing their benefits as sole support
parents. The related appeal of Mr. Thomas, heard at the same time as the
Falkiner appeal, involved a man with a disability losing his benefits as a
permanently unemployable person under the same deemed spouse
definition. Poverty provides the link between the inequalities associated
with femaleness, single parenthood, and disability. Justice John Laskin,
writing for a unanimous court, accepted the multiple-grounds approach and
11 It is interesting in this regard to note that Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 has referred to Symes as
containing the first use of substantive equality in a Supreme Court decision. See The Honourable
Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "A Conversation About Equality" (2000) 29 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 65 at
69, n. 20.
116 Gosselin c. Quibec, [1999] J.Q. No. 1365 (C.A.) (QL).
117 For information on this case, see http://dawn.thot.net/KimberlyRogers.
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held that the definition of spouse imposed differential treatment on the
applicants "... on the combined grounds of sex, marital status and receipt
of social assistance."" 8 If this decision and approach are upheld by the
Supreme Court, it would be a giant step forward in the recognition of socio-
economic rights. The acceptance of receipt of social assistance as an
analogous ground by the Supreme Court of Canada would be a major
inroad into the position, supported by the Ontario Court of Appeal, that
economic disadvantage, on its own, is not a basis for Charter protection.
Falkiner puts the issue of intersectional discrimination front and
centre. While the Court accepted the applicants' characterization of
themselves as being discriminated against on the basis that they are single
mothers on social assistance, it could not continue to deal with them as
unified, multi-identitied wholes. The discrimination had to be related back
to grounds and distinct comparator groups had to be determined with
respect to each ground. The structure of the equality analysis set out by the
Supreme Court of Canada in its decision in Law requires this kind of
dissection and the focus on comparator groups perpetuates the similarly
situated analysis that is a defining feature of formal equality. The
substantive equality of the Charter does not require identical treatment but,
to date, it has required the comparison of likes. This comparative approach
remains a limiting feature of the analysis and one that impedes the courts'
ability to address situations of intersectional discrimination in their complex
wholeness. Falkiner may be an indication that we are on the way to fuller
and more sensitive treatment of intersectional discrimination, although it
begs the question of the possibility of moving beyond the additive approach
of discrimination to an integrated approach.
III. CONCLUSION
[Olutsiders, including feminists and people of color, have embraced legalism as a tool of
necessity, making legal consciousness their own in order to attack injustice ... There are
times to stand outside the courtroom door and say "this procedure is a farce, the legal
system is corrupt, justice will never prevail in this land as long as privilege rules in the
courtroom." There are times to stand inside the courtroom and say "this is a nation of laws,
laws recognizing fundamental values of rights, equality and personhood." Sometimes, as
Angela Davis did, there is a need to make both speeches in one day."'
This is the equivocal nature of the Charter and of equality,
118 Falkiner, supra note 111 at 514.
119 Mari J. Matsuda, "When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method" (1989) 11 Women's L. Rep. 7 at 8.
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equivocation that I think is better seen as an opening than a shortcoming.
Legal commentators tend to view themselves and others as either critics or
supporters of the Charter, a demarcation that is seen to require the sacrifice
of vision for action or vice versa. Embracing the contradiction of
concurrent critique and invocation of the Charter may be one of the
Charter's gifts to us as social activists who have to learn how to do both,
simultaneously.
The critics and the pragmatists have both been right. As the cases
amply demonstrate, the Charter is full of problems, of analysis and of
results. At the same time, there have been some positive decisions, some
good equality analysis, and some statements that take my breath away
coming from the top court in our country. But this should be no
surprise-this is the nature of equality; it does not provide answers, not
even much in the way of direction; it is complex and contradictory and so,
necessarily, are the equality arguments and the equality decisions.
In terms of women and equality, in my assessment, the most clear-
cut gains have been with respect to reproduction and violence against
women, although even in these areas the victories have been only partial
and feel insecure. Although the risks of essentialism and overprotection are
high, these may be areas in which the gender analysis is more easily grasped
and perceived as less systemically threatening. Family issues are mired in
the tension between formal equality and substantive equality; the vision of
independent ungendered "equal" participants and the reality of gendered
dependencies, assumptions, and values clash. Deeper equality analysis and
more creative responses are needed.
The concerns raised about the Charter's inability, or the courts'
unwillingness, to address socio-economic disparities and related issues are
perhaps the most troubling. Given the current political climate and the
ever-widening gap between rich and poor, as well as what appears to be
increasing public tolerance for economic inequality, accompanied by
increasing intolerance for "the poor," it may be that socio-economic rights
are the most pressing equality issues for everyone, and particularly for
women. The Charter has provided a grounding for challenging these
inequalities, but these challenges have so far been largely unsuccessful,
despite their limited and specific foci and modest demands. The Charter
critiques have perhaps been borne out most strongly in this area-in terms
of an elitist judiciary refusing to recognize economic disadvantage as a
primary ground of discrimination, the limited application of the Charter
that precludes exposure of the "private" sector's role in poverty creation
and perpetuation, and the veneer of formal equality coupled with liberal
individualism that blame the most vulnerable and disadvantaged for the
"choices" they are assumed to have made. The irony, however, is that many
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of these left critiques of the Charter are the arguments most strongly
invoked against the Charter's application to socio-economic rights such that
the left critiques become a self-fulfilling prophecy in relation to one of the
most significant areas of potential Charter application. 20 Rather than
concede the critiques, these critiques need to be incorporated into Charter
challenges.
Intersectional discrimination is only one among a large number of
issues and shortcomings in the Charter that cry out for fundamental shifts
in our compartmentalized thinking, for creative advocacy, for vision and
revisioning, and for the kind of soul-searching, uncertainty, and risk taking
that Turpel advocated.' 21 It remains to be seen whether those arguing
within the constraints of the Charter can forge a way out of these restraints
to point the way, or a way, or ways, toward equality and social justice. The
restraints of the Charter are no more than the restraints of the society in
which we currently live- individualism, privilege, entrenched notions of
formal equality, and commitment to neutrality are prevailing social values.
They need to be challenged on all fronts. The Charter presents one avenue
for public education, mobilization, politicization, and creation of alliances
and goals. The Charter presents the opportunity for equality and social
justice advocates to critique and to dream at the same time and to pursue
those dreams of concrete social change under a document that was not
intended to accommodate fundamental social change. To me, these
opportunities are at least as important as the question of whether those
deciding Charter cases can be persuaded to embark on the social justice
quest.
120 See McIntyre, supra note 5.
121 Supra note 19.
